The book is about logical analysis of natural language. Since we humans communicate by means of natural language, we need a tool that helps us to understand in a precise manner how the logical and formal mechanisms of natural language work. Moreover, in the age of computers, we need to communicate both with and through computers as well. Transparent Intensional Logic is a tool that is helpful in making our communication and reasoning smooth and precise. It deals with all kinds (...) of linguistic context in a fully compositional and anti-contextual way. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes unless some additional assumptions are added, and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P , because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there (...) is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

This Festschrift is in honour of Professor Marie Duzí, VSB - Technical University of Ostrava. The 16 contributions, authored by 24 colleagues, run the gamut from foundations in logic and theoretical computer science through philosophical logic, multi-agent systems and theory of communication to personal recollections. Marie Duzí is best known for her profound and extensive work on both the foundations and multiple applications of Transparent Intensional Logic, originally developed by Pavel Tichý in the late 1960s. Her work, whether (...) single-authored or co-authored, has appeared in various high-level journals. In 2008 the Rector of her home university granted Marie the award Outstanding Results in the Development of Science and Research. The 2010 monograph Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic earned Marie and her coauthors the prestigious Award for Outstanding Results of Major Scientific Importance from the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. The major achievements of Transparent Intensional Logic that Marie has been involved in over the last decade have been compiled into the volume Transparent Intensional Logic: Selected Recent Essays, also published by College Publications. (shrink)

The Kantian idea that some judgments are synthetic even in the area of a priori judgments cannot be accepted in its original version, but a modification of the notions analytic' and 'synthetic' discovers a rational core of that idea. The new definition of 'analytic' concerns concepts and makes it possible to distinguish between analytic concepts, which are effective ways of computing recursive functions, and synthetic concepts, which either define non-recursive functions, or define recursive functions in an ineffective way. To justify (...) this claim we have to construe concepts as abstract procedures not reducible to set-theoretical entities. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is a philosophical explication and logical rectification of the notion of concept. We take into account only those contexts that are relevant from the logical point of view. It means that we are not interested in contexts characteristic of cognitive sciences, particularly of psychology, where concepts are conceived of as some kind of mental objects or representations. After a brief recapitulation of various theories of concept, in particular Frege’s and Church’s ones, we propose our own (...) theory based on procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and explicate concept in terms of the key notion of TIL, namely construction viewed as an abstract, algorithmically structured procedure. (shrink)

This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One (...) rule validates this inference: Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore, there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub- stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony- mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten- sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten- sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper- intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy- perintensions. (shrink)

Marie Duží, Bjørn Jespersen, and Pavel Materna: Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic. Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intentional Logic, vol. 17 of series “Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science”, Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, New York, 2010; xiii+552 pages, ISBN 978-90-481-8811-6, e-ISBN 978-90-481-8812-3. DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-8812-3.

This paper defendsintensional essentialism: a property (intensional entity) is not essential relative to an individual (extensional entity), but relative to other properties (or intensional entities). Consequently, an individual can have a property only accidentally, but in virtue of having that property the individual has of necessity other properties. Intensional essentialism is opposed to various aspects of the Kripkean notion of metaphysical modality, eg, varying domains, existence as a property of individuals, and its category of properties which are both empirical and (...) essential with respect to particular individuals and natural kinds. The key notion of intensional essentialism isrequisite. A requisite is explicated as a relation-in-extension between two intensions (functions from possible worlds and moments of time)X, Y such that wherever and wheneverX is instantiatedY is also instantiated. We predict three readings of the sentence. Every wooden table is necessarily wooden , one involving modalityde re and the other two modalityde dicto. The first reading claims that no individual which is a wooden table is necessarily wooden. The claim is backed up by bare particular anti-essentialism. The two other interpretations claim that it is necessary that whatever is a wooden table is wooden. However, as we try to show, one is logically far more perspicuous thanks to the concept of requisite and thus preferable to more standardde dicto formalizations. (shrink)

The topic of this special issue of Synthese is hyperintensionality. This introduction offers a brief survey of the very notion of hyperintensionality followed by a summary of each of the papers in this collection. The papers are foundational studies of hyperintensionality accompanied by ample philosophical applications.Hyperintensionality concerns the individuation of non-extensional entities such as propositions and properties, relations-in-intension and individual roles, as well as, for instance, proofs and judgments and computational procedures, in case these do not reduce to any of (...) the former. Hyperintensional individuation is frequently also referred to as ‘fine-grained’ or sometimes simply ‘intensional’ individuation, when ‘intensional’ is not understood in the specific sense of possible-world semantics or in the pejorative sense of flouting various logical rules of extensional logic. A principle of individuation qualifies as hyperintensional as soon as it is finer than necessary .. (shrink)

We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...) is always valid to quantify into hyperintensional attitude contexts and over hyperintensional entities. Second, factive empirical attitudes validate, furthermore, quantifying over intensions and extensions, and so do non-factive attitudes, both empirical and non-empirical , provided the entity to be quantified over exists. We focus mainly on mathematical attitudes, because they are uncontroversially hyperintensional. (shrink)

We prove how to validly quantify into hyperpropositional contexts de dicto in Transparent Intensional Logic. Hyperpropositions are sentential meanings and attitude complements individuated more finely than up to logical equivalence. A hyperpropositional context de dicto is a context in which only co-hyperintensional propositions can be validly substituted. A de dicto attitude ascription is one that preserves the attributee’s perspective when one complement is substituted for another. Being an extensional logic of hyperintensions, Transparent Intensional Logic validates all the rules of extensional (...) logic, including existential quantification. Yet the rules become more exacting when applied to hyperintensional contexts. The rules apply to only some types of entities, because the existence of only some types of entities is entailed by a hyperpropositional attitude de dicto. The insight that the paper offers is how a particular logic of hyperintensions is capable of validating quantifying-in in a principled and rigorous manner. This result advances the community-wide understanding of how to logically manipulate hyperintensions. (shrink)

Circumstantialists already have a logical semantics for impossibilities. They expand their logical space of possible worlds by adding impossible worlds. These are impossible circumstances serving as indices of evaluation, at which impossibilities are true. A variant of circumstantialism, namely modal Meinongianism (noneism), adds impossible objects as well. These are so-called incomplete objects that are necessarily non-existent. The opposite of circumstantialism, namely structuralism, has some catching-up to do. What might a structuralist logical semantics for impossibilities without impossibilia look like? This paper (...) makes a structuralist counterproposal. We present a semantics based on a procedural interpretation of the typed λ-calculus. The fundamental idea is that talk about impossibilities should be construed in terms of procedures: some yield as their product a condition that could not possibly have a satisfier, while the rest fail to yield a product altogether. Dispensing with a ‘bottom’ of impossibilia requires instead a ‘top’ consisting of structured hyperintensions, intensions, intensions defining other intensions, a typed universe, and dual (de dicto and de re) predication. We explain how the theory works by going through several examples. (shrink)

The standard rule of single privative modification replaces privative modifiers by Boolean negation. This rule is valid, for sure, but also simplistic. If an individual a instantiates the privatively modified property (MF) then it is true that a instantiates the property of not being an F, but the rule fails to express the fact that the properties (MF) and F have something in common. We replace Boolean negation by property negation, enabling us to operate on contrary rather than contradictory properties. (...) To this end, we apply our theory of intensional essentialism, which operates on properties (intensions) rather than their extensions. We argue that each property F is necessarily associated with an essence, which is the set of the so-called requisites of F that jointly define F. Privation deprives F of some but not all of its requisites, replacing them by their contradictories. We show that properties formed from iterated privatives, such as being an imaginary fake banknote, give rise to a trifurcation of cases between returning to the original root property or to a property contrary to it or being semantically undecidable for want of further information. In order to determine which of the three forks the bearers of particular instances of multiply modified properties land upon we must examine the requisites, both of unmodified and modified properties. Requisites underpin our presuppositional theory of positive predication. Whereas privation is about being deprived of certain properties, the assignment of requisites to properties makes positive predication possible, which is the predication of properties the bearers must have because they have a certain property formed by means of privation. (shrink)

In the paper I analyse Anselm’s ontological arguments in favour of God’s existence. The analysis is an explication and formalization of Pavel Tichý’s study‘Existence and God’, Journal of Philosophy, 1979. It is based on Transparent Intensional Logic with its bi-dimensional ontology of entities organized in the ramified hierarchy of types. The analysis goes as follows. First, necessary notions and principles are introduced. They are: (a) existence is not a (non-trivial) property of individuals, but of individual offices to be occupied by (...) an individual; (b) the notion of requisite is defined, which is a necessary relation between an office O and a property R: necessarily, if a happens to occupy O then a has the property R. (c) I demonstrate that an argument of the form “R is a requisite of O, hence the holder of O has the property R” is invalid. In order to be valid, it must be of the form “R is a requisite of O, the office O is occupied, hence the holder of O has the property R.” Finally, (d) higher-order offices that can be occupied by individual offices are defined. Their requisites are properties of individual offices. Then the analysis of Anselm’s arguments is presented. The expression ‘God’ denotes an individual office, a ‘thing to be’, rather than a particular individual. Thus the question whether God exists is a legitimate one. I analyze the expression ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Since ‘greater than’ is a relation-in-intension between individual offices here, the expression denotes a second-order office, and its requisites are properties of first-order offices suchas necessary existence. The second of Anselm’s assumptions is that individual office that has the property of necessary existence is greater than any other office lacking this property. From these it follows that the first-order holder of the office denoted by ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (that is God) enjoys the property of necessary existence. Thus God exists necessarily, hence also actually. Anselm’s argument is logically valid. If it were also sound, then an atheist would differ from a believer only by the former not believing whereas the latter believing in a tautology, which is absurd. Yet we may doubt the validity of Anselm’s assumption that a necessary existence makes an office greater than any other office lacking this property. (shrink)

Introduction. PHilosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Formal Turn Piotr Stalmaszczyk Gottlob Frege, Philosophy of Language, and Predication Piotr Stalmaszczyk Philosophy, Linguistics and Semantic Interpretation Christian Bassac An Unresolved Issue: Nonsense in Natural Language and Non-Classical Logical and Semantic Systems Elzbieta Chrzanowska-Kluczewska Varieties of Context-Dependence Tadeusz Ciecierski The Logos of Semantic Structure Marie Du í, Bjørn Jespersen and Pavel Materna The Good Samaritan and the Hygienic Cook: A Cautionary Tale About Linguistic Data Chris Fox The Meaning of Multiple (...) Quantified Sentences: Where Formal Semantics Meets Psycholinguistics Justyna Grudzinska The Hybrid Theory of Reference for Proper Names Filip Kawczynski On the Nature of Statistical Language Laws Agnieszka Kulacka Vagueness and Contextualism Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska The Myth of Semantic Structure Jaroslav Peregrin Scalar Implicatures, Communication and Language Evolution Salvatore Pistoia Reda Semantics and Contextuality: The Case of Pia s Leaves Stefano Predelli Is Logico-Semantical Analysis of Natural Language Expressions a Translation? Jirí Raclavský Beyond the Fregean Myth: The Value of Logical Values Fabien Schang Modal Calculus of Illocutionary Logic Andrew Schumann Subjectivity in Philosophy and Linguistics Barbara Sonnenhauser Asymmetrical Semantics Mieszko Talasiewicz Truth: An Anti-realist Adequacy Condition Luca Tranchini Belief Reports: Defaults, Intentions and Scorekeeping Giacomo Turbanti On Truth in Time Bartosz Wieckowski Order William J. SUllivan Indexes. (shrink)

The paper solves the problems connected with the occurrences of expressions in the de re or de dicto supposition. It is shown that some expressions, e.g. definite descriptions, that are seemingly ambiguous are in no way ambiguous, they denote in all the contexts one and the same “thing” and have a precise definite meaning which is best explicated by the TIL logical construction. What differs is only the supposition in which they occur. The precise definition of the distinction between de (...) re, de dicto occurrence is provided, and using this definition four kinds of problems are analysed, namely de re / de dicto using definite descriptions , sentences , definite descriptions in notional attitudes, and embedded sentences in propositional attitudes. The paper provides a certain adjustment and correction of Tichý’s approach to the problem. (shrink)

The paper completes a “serial” of my contributions to the hot problems of current semantics, i.e. propositional / notional attitudes, de dicto / de re, synonymy, homonymy, equivalence, meaning, sense, denotation, reference. Two kinds of believing, knowing, etc. are distinguished, namely implicit believing of an ideal believer and explicit believing of a logical / mathematical ignorant . A special case of a week, hidden homonymy is considered and we show that when claiming two expressions being synonymous we have to be (...) careful, for a more fine-grained analysis may reveal that there is a semantic difference between them. The distinction between de dicto / de re supposition is defined and a special case of ‘existence’ being de dicto / de re is solved. (shrink)

Our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, etc., concern primarily logical constructions of propositions. If we assume that iterating ‘belief attitudes’ is valid, i.e., that the agent is perfectly introspective, he knows what he knows, believes, etc., then the so-called propositional attitudes are actually hyperintensional attitudes, i.e., they are relations of an agent to the construction–concept expressed by the embedded clause. Their implicit counterparts, relations of an agent to the proposition denoted by the embedded clause, are just idealised cases of an agent with (...) unlimited inferential abilities. On the other hand, our wishes, intentions, seeking, finding, etc., concern particular intensions, and the so-called notional attitudes are not hyperintensional. In the paper we formulate some criteria for notional attitudes and examine basic categories of them. In general, notional attitudes are relations-in-intension between an agent and an object to which the agent is intentionally related. Even relations of an agent to a proposition can be notional ones, in case there is no salient constructional counterpart, the attitude is not influenced by agent’s inferential abilities. Another problem we meet is the ambiguity of sentences expressing notional attitudes. These statements can often be read both in the de dicto and in the de re way. Yet, a common feature that characterizes notional attitudes is using the construction of the respective intension in the de dicto way. The respective intension is mentioned; referring on such a situation, the reporter may use any of the equivalent constructions of the intension, but not just a co-referring notion of another intension. Still, unlike the cases of relations of an agent to an individual when the respective individual office serves just as a pointer to the individual, when referring on notional attitudes the use of the respective notion of the intension is indispensable, which might perhaps justify calling such attitudes notional, though they actually are intensional. We also show that a passive form of a sentence cannot be usually read in the de dicto way. Thus a common belief at the equivalence of the active and passive form of a statement is generally not justified. (shrink)

This paper deals with two issues. First, it identifies structured propositions with logical procedures. Second, it considers various rigorous definitions of the granularity of procedures, hence also of structured propositions, and comes out in favour of one of them. As for the first point, structured propositions are explicated as algorithmically structured procedures. I show that these procedures are structured wholes that are assigned to expressions as their meanings, and their constituents are sub-procedures occurring in executed mode. Moreover, procedures are not (...) mere aggregates of their parts; rather, procedural constituents mutually interact. As for the second point, there is no universal criterion of the structural isomorphism of meanings, hence of co-hyperintensionality, hence of synonymy for every kind of language. The positive result I present is an ordered set of rigorously defined criteria of fine-grained individuation in terms of the structure of procedures. Hence procedural semantics provides a solution to the problem of the granularity of co-hyperintensionality. (shrink)

This study investigated acute effects of real and imagined endurance exercise on sustained attention performance in healthy young adults in order to shed light on the action mechanisms underlying changes in cognitive functioning. The neural similarities between both imagined and physically performed movements reveal that imagery induces transient hypofrontality, whereas real exercise reflects both transient hypofrontality effects and the global release of signaling factors due to muscle contraction and the accompanying sensory feedback. We hypothesized improved cognitive functioning after both interventions (...) with greater improvements for real exercise because it targets both mechanisms. Fifty-three sport science students completed two 25-min sessions of moderate endurance exercise in either a motor imagery modality or an executed bodily activity within the framework of an order-balanced crossover study. Assessments for sustained attention performance were performed before and after each endurance exercise condition. Statistical results showed improvements for both groups over time, which can mostly be explained by retest effects. However, we observed a significant interaction effect between group and time, F = 3.64, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.07, with higher increases in the first session in case physical endurance exercise was performed compared to motor imagery exercise, t = −2.71, p = 0.09, d = 0.75. This might suggest that the release of signaling factors due to muscle contractions with sensory feedback processing is an additional mediating mechanism alongside motor-related transient hypofrontality that improves cognitive performance. (shrink)

The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, (...) it fails to provide any novel information. Again, ESI does not give a satisfactory account of the paradox. In this paper I propose a solution based on the distinction between empirical information and analytic information. Declarative sentences are informative due to their meanings. I construe meanings as structured hyperintensions, modelled in Transparent Intensional Logic as so-called constructions. These are abstract, algorithmically structured procedures whose constituents are sub-procedures. My main thesis is that constructions are the vehicles of information. Hence, although analytically true sentences provide no empirical information about the state of the world, they convey analytic information, in the shape of constructions prescribing how to arrive at the truths in question. Moreover, even though analytically equivalent sentences have equal empirical content, their analytic content may be different. Finally, though the empirical content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, its analytic content may be different from the analytic content of the premises and thus convey a new piece of information. (shrink)

The boundary between analytic and synthetic sentences is well definable. Quine’s attempt to make it vague is based on a misunderstanding: instead of freeing semantics from shortcomings found, e.g. in Carnap’s work, Quine actually rejects semantics of natural language and replaces it by behavioristically articulated pragmatics. Semantics of natural language as a logical analysis is however possible and it can justify hard and fast lines between analyticity and syntheticity.

Propositional and notional attitudes are construed as relations (-in-intension) between individuals and constructions (rather than propositrions etc,). The apparatus of transparent intensional logic (Tichy) is applied to derive two rules that make it possible to export existential quantifiers without conceiving attitudes as relations to expressions (sententialism).